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INTRODUCTION
Since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United
States in 1979, cooperation in science and technology has been a notable feature in
the ties between the two countries. While of secondary importance to the cardinal
political, security, and economic issues facing the relationship, U.S.–China S&T re-
lations are nevertheless broad and deep. They have served as an important glue keep-
ing the two sides in touch during periods when political relations were strained. This
was especially true in the period following the 1989 Tiananmen events, when most
other government–government ties of significance were suspended. The S&T rela-
tionship has been likened to rocks at the seacoast by one Chinese official long active
in U.S.–China scientific relations. During periods of good political relations, the im-
portance of the S&T ties is less visible; at times of tension, they are considerably
more prominent.
Government-to-government S&T relations have been—and continue to be—a
central, structuring element of the overall S&T relationship. However, unlike Chi-
na’s S&T relations with other states, which tend to be driven from the top and highly
centralized, China-U.S. relations are much more decentralized.1 Sino–American sci-
ence and technology cooperation extends well beyond that prescribed in official
agreements to include extensive academic and commercial ties and relations be-
tween professional societies. The enduring integrative importance of the S&T rela-
tionship may be a function of the decentralized, “bottom up,” and pluralistic nature
of these links.
As discussed below, the S&T relationship continues to evolve; in both countries,
much has changed since 1978 with regard to domestic politics, perceptions of inter-
national security issues, economic development issues, and research and develop-
ment needs and capabilities. In addition, science and technology are becoming more
important as factors influencing the political, economic, and, increasingly, environ-
mental issues of “high politics.” This is likely to open up new opportunities for S&T
cooperation with higher levels of political support. At the same time, there is a risk
that increased political importance of S&T may contribute to the politicization of
S&T relationships in ways that may increase bilateral conflict rather than lessen it,
as conflicts over the export of strategic technologies and the protection of intellectu-
al property illustrate.
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U.S. AND CHINESE INTERESTS IN S&T COOPERATION
Events preceding and following the normalization of relations between the Unit-
ed States and China set in course new approaches to the use of S&T cooperation in
diplomacy (see Kathlin Smith’s chapter in this volume). After almost three decades
of mutual hostility and isolation, the U.S.–China intergovernmental S&T relation-
ship suddenly blossomed. By the early 1980s, the relationship with China had be-
come the largest and most ambitious of all bilateral S&T relations maintained by
both the United States and China. While rapidly improving political relations in the
late 1970s were driven in the first instance by a common desire to contain the Soviet
Union, scientific and technological cooperation also had a special appeal to the two
countries as the process of normalization proceeded. A brief review of why this was
the case is helpful.
From the Chinese side, interest in cooperation with the United States in S&T was
inseparable from the complex consequences of the Cultural Revolution, and of Mao-
ist doctrines of antiprofessionalism and self-reliance for Chinese S&T. The two most
important of these were the disruption of the Chinese R&D and higher educational
enterprises and the increasing relative backwardness of Chinese industrial technolo-
gy. With regard to the former, the radical politics of the Cultural Revolution pro-
duced a highly unstable environment for research over the course of more than ten
years, as scientific organizations were disrupted, reorganized, and/or shut down.
More importantly, the disruption of the higher education system meant that the pool
of technical manpower was not being replenished and that a cohort of scientists and
engineers was lost.
These problems came at a time of dramatic advances in science and technology
internationally, and at a time when instrumentation and the technologies of research
more generally were being revolutionized in the advanced industrialized countries.
With the initiation of scientific exchange visits after the Nixon trip to China in 1972,
Chinese technical personnel had new opportunities to observe first hand just how far
China had fallen behind as a result of Maoist excesses. As the decade wore on, it be-
came clear that self-reliance would have to be abandoned, especially with regard to
the problem of bringing the training of new generations of scientists and engineers
up to world standards as quickly as possible. Mao’s death in 1976 and Deng Xiaop-
ing’s ascendancy in 1977–78 cleared the way for the new “open” policy and new op-
portunities to work with the United States.
A similar story could be told with regard to industrial technology and serious
problems of declining rates of industrial productivity in the 1970s. The inherent in-
novation problems of the Soviet model for research and industrial production had
long plagued Chinese industry, and continued to do so even as China made its own
modifications to the Soviet model. These problems were compounded by Cultural
Revolution radicalism and assaults on technological and managerial expertise.
Again, the lost opportunities and radical disruptions in China occurred at a time
when high-technology industry was beginning to come into its own in the advanced
industrial countries, and when successful experiments in rapid industrial develop-
ment and technological enhancement were becoming well established among Chi-
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na’s Asian neighbors and in its “renegade province” of Taiwan. Although China had
begun to relax its technological self-reliance principles in the early 1970s with the
selective importation of advanced technologies from Japan and Europe, U.S. science
and technology held a special allure, and Chinese elites believed they needed access
to it.
In the United States, the decision to give S&T the prominence it came to have in
the process of renewing relations with China was driven by a number of factors.
First, because the United States understood the situation in China, described above,
it knew that access to U.S. science and technology could be used as an incentive for
improving political relations. During the Carter administration, there was much talk
of building a “web of relations” with China that would go well beyond formal gov-
ernment–government ties and that would create constituencies in both countries for
close political relations. The encouragement of S&T ties was seen as an important
strand in this web.
In addition, U.S. policy thinking about China in the late 1970s already contained
“global commons” concerns of relevance to international scientific cooperation.
While environmental protection issues were not prominent at that time (as they have
become), the amelioration of food, energy, and population problems in China
through S&T enhancement was seen as consistent with U.S. interests in attacking
these issues internationally; the reduction of China’s demands on global food and en-
ergy supplies as a result of its own scientific and technological development, for in-
stance, would mean greater availability for others.
While the quality of Chinese research in most fields was not initially a significant
attraction to the United States, access to unique Chinese data sources and distinctive
Chinese natural and human phenomena—flora and fauna, topography, village life,
archives etc.—held considerable appeal to biologists, medical scientists, geophysi-
cists, meteorologists, historians, and social scientists. As Kathlin Smith’s chapter
documents, in the preparatory period leading up to the re-establishment of diplomat-
ic relations, natural scientists and social scientists in the United States found com-
mon cause in the improvement of scholarly relations with China. Common as well
was the belief that rebuilding and revitalizing the Chinese scholarly enterprise after
the ravages of the Cultural Revolution were both in United States interests and, rem-
iniscent of the “missionary impulses” in U.S.–China relations earlier in the century,
a worthy calling in their own right.
In U.S. thinking about the building of S&T ties as part of the hoped-for web of
relations, the presence in China of a substantial number of Chinese scientists and en-
gineers who had been educated in the United States prior to 1949 represented an im-
portant resource. It was correctly assumed, that there was a reservoir of good will
and understanding of U.S. society among these senior, and often more prestigious,
members of the Chinese technical community. If these U.S.-trained personnel from
an earlier period could be seen as a resource for building a new relationship in the
late 1970s, then the replenishment of that resource for an ongoing close relationship
of cooperation warranted high-level attention. Thus began the opening up of U.S. in-
stitutions of higher education to the roughly 220,000 Chinese students and scholars
who started coming to the United States at the end of the 1970s, a stream of person-
nel which continues today.2
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THE VARIETY OF INTERACTIONS
In reviewing the nature of U.S. and Chinese interests in building a strong S&T
relationship, it is helpful to distinguish between science and technology, between the
natural and social sciences, and between research cooperation and educational ex-
change. It is safe to assume that among Chinese decision makers in the 1970s, dis-
tinctions between “science” and “technology” were seldom finely drawn. Chinese
elites since the mid-nineteenth century had placed great hope in “science” to make
China a strong and prosperous society without ever examining carefully the relation-
ships between science and technology and, in particular, the relationships between
scientific research and technological innovation. Faulty understandings of the nature
of technological innovation were reinforced by the embrace of the Soviet model in
the 1950s, a decision that established and maintained the key institutional features
of the research and production systems until the major reform programs of the
1980s.
From the point of view of China’s national leaders in the 1970s, there was less
interest in science for the sake of science—and, thus, scientific cooperation with the
United States for the sake of science—than in the longer-term practical benefits that
a modernized scientific establishment would bring to China and in the more imme-
diate benefits which U.S. advanced technology, once transferred to China, would
bring. But in blurring distinctions between science and technology, Chinese leaders
also did not immediately grasp the nature of institutional arrangements in the United
States, which stem from distinctions made between “science” and “technology” in
the West. Of particular importance is the notion of separate realms of public and pri-
vate knowledge, and the fact that access to the latter is only indirectly subject to in-
fluence by government action. While many in China thought that the initiation of
S&T cooperation with the United States via government-to-government agreement
would open up access to usable industrial, communications, transportation, and oth-
er technologies, the reality was that many of the technologies of greatest interest to
China were in private hands, and that access to them would be a function of business
decisions, not government policy. On the other hand, when China began to devise
business agreements with private companies that involved the transfer of advanced
technologies, it also discovered that the government could under some circumstanc-
es assert a public interest over the transfer of technology through export controls
when national security concerns were involved. Interestingly, therefore, while scien-
tific cooperation has generally been a conflict-reducing, integrative factor in the bi-
lateral relationship, issues of technological cooperation have at times been matters
of misunderstanding, irritation, and conflict.
Distinctions between the natural and social sciences have also been important in
the S&T relationship. As noted above, in the United States, natural and social scien-
tists found common ground in their desire for improved relations with China. The
sponsorship of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Re-
public of China—by the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research
Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies—was a powerful symbol
of this shared commitment. In China, however, the situation was different. The social
sciences were in much worse condition than the natural sciences, the development
of most fields having been stunted by political diktats in the 1950s that there could
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be no social science independent of class interest. Thus, while many Chinese schol-
ars in the social sciences and humanities looked forward to new ties with U.S. col-
leagues, Chinese political elites who welcomed the development of an S&T
relationship in the late 1970s had little interest in the social sciences. With little so-
cial science in China, and a pervasive belief that all social science in the United
States was bourgeois social science, the elite saw no utility in developing relations
in this area.
This asymmetry in outlook, and the attendant institutional asymmetries, have
been a not infrequent cause of conflict in the relationship. From the U.S. point of
view, the spirit and letter of the agreements for cooperation entailed research access
for social scientists and humanistic scholars as well as natural scientists. Such access
was factored into the U.S. calculus of mutual benefits that underlay the agreements,
and without it, the United States came to believe that it was giving much more than
it received from the relationship. U.S. social science interests were active in pushing
their cases and often prevailed on U.S. officials to pressure China to respect U.S.
views of reciprocity. For the China of the early post-normalization period, respond-
ing to U.S. expectations on these matters was troublesome in the extreme. This was
so not only because the Chinese had little use for the social sciences, but also be-
cause the opening up of previously guarded historical archives and social science
field sites represented a radical shift from the “closed-door” mentality of Maoist
China with its tight control over information, distrust of foreigners, and its policies
of limiting, monitoring, and controlling their movements. Issues of the social scienc-
es continue to be a problem in the relationship. From 1990 to 1993 there was conflict
over the Chinese seizure of survey data gathered by an American investigator oper-
ating with NSF support, which disrupted NSF programs with China for more than a
year. Nevertheless, China’s interest in, appreciation of, and support for at least some
areas of the social sciences (e.g., economics) have changed as the reform and open-
door policies initiated in the late 1970s evolved.
A final distinction warranting our attention is that between research cooperation,
and training and educational exchanges. As noted above, opportunities for training
a new generation of technical personnel in order to “jump start” the resumption of
indigenous research and education after the Cultural Revolution was a high priority
for the Chinese. The United States was also keen to cooperate in this training mission
for reasons of both altruism and national interest. As a result, one of the first agree-
ments signed (October 1978) was the Understanding on the Exchange of Students
and Scholars. This agreement signified that the United States was prepared to make
a long term commitment to the training of a new generation of scientists and engi-
neers, while also committing China to provide educational opportunities and re-
search access to U.S. scholars wishing to work in China. At the time, of course, it
was primarily social scientists and humanists from the U.S.–China studies commu-
nity who were most interested.
While research cooperation has become a more important part of the relationship
with the passage of time, the longer-term scientific, commercial, and political sig-
nificance of the educational exchanges warrants reiteration. As Wendy Frieman not-
ed in a recent commentary on U.S. educational exchanges with Asia generally,
International education promotes and supports virtually all major U.S. foreign policy
and business objectives, often in subtle and undocumented ways. U.S. businessmen,
military commanders, or government officials who are trying to navigate a foreign
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country requently use relationships with former classmates to short circuit what could
be a lengthy and expensive process. Scientists and engineers, in particular, seem to
form long lasting ties that transcend distance, language and politics. American engi-
neers who visit Thailand or China or Indonesia and contact their former classmates,
post-docs, graduate students or lab partners from those countries can tap into special
relationships. They sometimes have an entrée with unique access to a country’s science
and technology infrastructure that is essential for success in collaborative research,
joint production and marketing, and even market intelligence. Often the American sci-
entists and engineers involved in this process do not themselves realize the value of the
these connections. Without them, however, American business would spend consider-
able time meeting with senior business executives of Asian companies before getting
access to the technical staff. Asian firms tend to be more formally and hierarchically
managed than most U.S. high technology firms; a preexisting relationship among sci-
entists and engineers is often a way to cut through layers of the system.3
When one considers the large numbers of Chinese students and scholars who
have come to U.S. universities since the end of the 1970s, the potential for long-term
cooperation and conflict management through the mechanisms identified by Frie-
man is quite significant. This is especially true with respect to China, where personal
relationships (guanxi) play such an important role in facilitating communications
and collective action.
THE STRUCTURE FOR S&T RELATIONS AFTER NORMALIZATION
Prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United
States in January 1979, the momentum for an ambitious new S&T relationship was
already building. As noted by Kathlin Smith, an important event in this process was
the visit to China, in July 1978, of a delegation of the heads of the technical agencies
of the U.S. government led by then science adviser to President Carter, Dr. Frank
Press.4 This visit was important for a number of reasons, not the least of which was
the symbolism of high-level, government–government contacts prior to the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations.
It should be recalled that prior to normalization, both sides took great care, to the
extent then possible, to avoid contacts that were “governmental” or “official,” rely-
ing instead upon nominally nongovernmental organizations to conduct S&T ex-
changes after the 1972 Nixon visit. In China, responsibility for S&T contacts with
the United States lay in the hands of the China Association for Science and Technol-
ogy (CAST), the peak organization of professional societies, nominally analogous
to the AAAS in the United States, but in actuality, an arm of the Communist Party.5
In the United States, the leading national organization was the Committee on Schol-
arly Communication with the People’s Republic of China (CSCPRC) which, though
nongovernmental, received some of its financial support during this period from the
U.S. government and maintained regular liaison with officials responsible for China
policy within the government.
The Press mission, which was received by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, thus
broke new diplomatic ground, and programatically, it laid the foundations for the ex-
pansive intergovernmental program which came into being following normalization.
But even before the re-establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the Understand-
ing on the Exchange of Students and Scholars was signed in October during a visit
to the United States by physicist Zhou Peiyuan, the Understanding on Agricultural
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Exchange was signed in November, and the Understanding on Cooperation in Space
Technology was signed in December. In addition, the details for a cooperative pro-
gram in high-energy physics, which was formalized in a signed agreement in Janu-
ary 1979, were worked out during a late fall 1978 trip to China by Secretary of
Energy, James Schlesinger.6
Coincident with the re-establishment of formal diplomatic relations in January,
Deng Xiaoping and President Jimmy Carter signed the Agreement between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Repub-
lic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology, which in turn provided for
the establishment of a Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Coopera-
tion. Through an exchange of letters, the two governments agreed to subsume the
student and scholar exchange and the agricultural and space understandings under
this new “umbrella agreement.” In the months that followed, U.S. technical agencies
were encouraged by the White House to seek new agreements with Chinese counter-
part agencies, a process that continued after the change in administrations in 1980
and that today has resulted in close to 30 protocols (with numerous annexes) under
the umbrella agreement in areas as diverse as basic sciences, occupational health and
safety, and scientific information. Since 1979, these have led to over 1000 coopera-
tive projects involving over 10,000 scientists and engineers. At the seventh meeting
of the Joint Commission in October 1996, the umbrella agreement was extended for
another five years
While there certainly were nongovernmental S&T interactions with China prior
to normalization, as we have seen, the establishment of official government–govern-
ment ties catalyzed much more energetic efforts outside of government to build
bridges between the technical and educational communities of the two countries.
This was especially true of universities, which, once they began to receive students
and scholars from China, sought out formal relations with Chinese institutions of
higher learning. Professional societies and the National Academy of Sciences
(which entered into an agreement with the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1980)
also followed suit. With the signing of bilateral agreements for economic coopera-
tion and for trade and investment as well, U.S. firms expanded their operations in
China and selectively began to engage in various forms of technology transfer. The
policy designers’ dream of creating a “web of relations” thus became a reality in the
post-normalization era.
As Kathlin Smith has noted, American scientists of Chinese descent played an
important role in the pre-normalization period with some, such as Yang Chen-ning,
having access to China’s highest leaders. After normalization, the importance of
these individuals as bridges between two cultures increased and contributed to many
of the successes that have come out of the relationship. Chinese-American scientists
and engineers in government agencies and private companies were recruited into the
service of the relationship, and those in universities played an important role in the
recruitment, reception, and training of Chinese students and scholars coming to U.S.
institutions of higher education. An especially prominent example of the latter was
the T.D. Lee scholars’ program, initiated by Nobel laureate Lee Tseng-dao of Co-
lumbia University, which has sought to identify the best and brightest young physi-
cists in China and to insure that they were placed in the premier U.S. physics
programs.
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Institutional and Cultural Asymmetries
In discussions of U.S.–Japan S&T cooperation, problems of institutional asym-
metries, and the consequences those have for reciprocity in the access that research-
ers from one country have to the institutions of the other, have been a source of
conflict. For instance, since a great deal of important precompetitive research is con-
ducted in the private settings of Japanese companies, in contrast to the public set-
tings of U.S. universities and government research institutes, the United States has
been concerned that exclusion from corporate laboratories creates problems of
asymmetrical access, which creates a disadvantage to the United States in the rela-
tionship.
Issues of asymmetrical access exist in the U.S.–China relationship as well, but
they are the product of markedly different conditions. To understand these, it will be
helpful to reflect briefly on the cultural values and institutional arrangements both
countries brought to the relationship. The United States initiated S&T cooperation
with China from a position of strength and confidence in the realization that its sci-
ence and technology were at the leading edge internationally in most fields. It
brought to the relationship a legacy of institutional pluralism and decentralization
that was internationally distinctive, with the great American research universities be-
ing in many ways the crown jewels of the system. These were institutions whose
greatness was inseparable from the values of openness, cosmopolitanism, and inter-
nationalism, and the tradition of investigator-initiated research.
Early post-normalization China could hardly have been more different. That the
relationship has worked as well as it has may be a good measure of the extent to
which many Chinese were committed to change, and saw in the relationship oppor-
tunities to pursue an agenda of reform. The China that emerged from the Cultural
Revolution was one that had lost confidence in its ruling values and institutions. The
great hope for scientific and technological development, which added vibrancy to
China’s optimistic society of the 1950s, had been dashed by two decades of radical
political excess and by the militarization of science as a result of high-priority na-
tional security projects. Secrecy and the protection of narrow, parochial interests
were the order of the day. When the U.S.–China relationship was established, things
foreign were objects of distrust. Institutionally, the Chinese university was still re-
covering from the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution and, as a result of a series
of decisions taken in the 1950s in emulation of the Soviet Union, their research role
was markedly secondary to those of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the mis-
sion-oriented institutes of government ministries. Whereas the logic of the U.S. sys-
tem emphasized openness, decentralization, pluralism, and investigator initiative,
that of China emphasized central planning and the compartmentalization of informa-
tion.
Given these asymmetries of values, institutions, and capabilities, it is remarkable
that a program based on the principle of mutual benefit could make progress. It did,
however, though not without conflict and accommodations. Access to Chinese data
sources has been an ongoing problem in the social sciences and humanities, and has
also been an issue in some areas of natural sciences such as those involving germ
plasm and the ingredients of the traditional Chinese pharmacopeia. Interestingly, as
Chinese society became more open and commercially oriented during the 1980s, the
nature of the access problems changed in ways that were perhaps more conflict-in-
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ducing. With institutional budgets being cut in keeping with reform objectives (see
below), and with the “cost-internalizing” logic of the market economy beginning to
take hold, Chinese research organizations began to charge U.S. investigators ever
higher fees for access. Since this was often done in a less than transparent manner,
it was not unusual for resentment to develop among researchers and administrators
over what were believed to be excessive and unfair charges.7
Access to U.S. facilities and events has also been an issue at times when U.S. pol-
icymakers determined that aspects of the S&T relationship with China verged on
compromising national security objectives. Interestingly, while export controls over
the transfers of technologies were—and continue to be—maintained, efforts to con-
trol the activities of Chinese students and scholars in universities and at professional
meetings were resisted as much by U.S. scientists as by the Chinese government.
National Program Coordination
Issues of asymmetry are also evident in the institutions charged with conducting
the relationship at the government level. In the United States, until the Tiananmen
events of 1989, there was a gradual decentralizing devolution to the technical agen-
cies in the conduct of the relationship, leading to vital, enduring, operational rela-
tionships between the technical agencies of the two governments. The White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) had overall responsibility for U.S.
government S&T relations with China, but after the energetic, proactive leadership
from OSTP during the Carter administration, its role diminished somewhat as the re-
lationship became more routinized and as policy priorities evolved. The Bureau of
Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs (OES) of the State Department was en-
trusted with serving as the secretariat for the United States in the Joint Commission
and for coordinating the activities of the technical agencies with regard to implemen-
tation of the agreements and low-level policy matters. Meanwhile, in keeping with
the traditions of U.S. society, nongovernmental institutions continued to expand
their contacts with China as their own interests dictated. The CSCPRC, for instance,
continued to expand its programs—with considerable support coming from govern-
ment—and served as something of a clearing house for information about what var-
ious sectors in the United States were doing in relations with China during the 1980s.
However, because the number and range of activities across the nation in so many
different sectors is so large, this effort was inherently limited by the availability of
resources.
Thus, the United States had, at best, limited central policy and coordinating
mechanisms for its S&T relations with China, although informal ties among schol-
ars, government officials, representatives of private foundations, and members of the
business community—with the NAS and the CSCPRC often playing important facil-
itating roles— produced more coherence in national purpose than the formal ar-
rangements themselves would have led one to expect. Consistent with this
decentralization of policy and coordination was the decentralization of funding. In
spite of the high priority given to the role of S&T relations in the broader U.S.–China
relationship, the U.S. government has approached China ties in much the same way
it approached bilateral S&T relations with most other countries. The operating prin-
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ciple has been that the technical agencies’ activities with China must be consistent
with their overall missions. To insure adherence to this principle, the agencies have
had to finance their relations with Chinese counterparts out of their regular budgets,
thus forcing China- related projects to compete with domestic and other internation-
al projects on the basis of technical merit rather than political appeal. Where there
has not been a true mutuality of interests, but where one side had an interest in an
activity, the principle of “benefiting side pays” has prevailed. While this approach
may have led to some lost opportunities for political benefit in the short term, it has
probably enhanced the long-term value of the relationship for both countries, since
it has led to cooperation based on real interests which can outlast the changing po-
litical moods that have characterized Sino-American ties at the level of high politics.
While a decentralized approach to S&T relations with China has had a number of
benefits, the costs of decentralization are less apparent. Intuitively, though, they
seem to exist and may warrant attention. There have certainly been opportunity costs
from decentralization, especially with regard to marrying programs for S&T coop-
eration with opportunities for building new commercial relationships. While the
Clinton administration has shown an interest in building on the former to enhance
the latter,8 for most of the period since 1979, there has not been a carefully coordi-
nated effort to wed S&T and commerce.
A second area where the costs of decentralization have yet to be estimated is in
the problem of assessing the overall national or collective benefits accruing to the
United States from its multifaceted S&T ties with China. Such an assessment, in
fact, would be difficult and may not even be desirable. But the United States is left
with the unanswered question of whether individual programs of government agen-
cies, universities, foundations, corporations, etc.—which by themselves are rational
and justifiable—are collectively in the national interest.
The costs of decentralization are undoubtedly higher than they might be as a re-
sult of the fact that those parts of the U.S. government that have the coordination and
general oversight functions, the OSTP and OES, experience frequent personnel
changes. While officials in the technical agencies often have many years of dealing
with Chinese counterparts, at the policy and coordination levels, institutional mem-
ories are often weak or nonexistent. Given that OSTP personnel change with changes
in administration, and OES staff are typically rotated according to Foreign Service
schedules (and that for most incumbents, the time spent in OES is not regarded as
career enhancing), it is not surprising that the Chinese side has often been frustrated
and annoyed at what it regards (especially after changes in administrations) as a cer-
tain amateurism among U.S. officials.
As one would expect from the nature of the Chinese government and the condi-
tions of Chinese society, the situation with regard to policy and coordination in Chi-
na is somewhat different, with more centralization, planning, and specialized
budgeting. As noted above, prior to normalization, a key organization in S&T rela-
tions with the United States was CAST. Once government–government relations
were established, however, other players entered the game and began to play more
important roles. Although the CAST–CSCPRC relationship continued for a few
years (CAST continues relations with AAAS), it gradually faded in importance as
CAST itself changed. The new Chinese actors were the Chinese Academy of Scienc-
es (CAS), the State Education Commission (SEDC), and the State Science and Tech-
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nology Commission (SSTC). The SSTC became the coordinating center for relations
with the United States and served as the secretariat for the Chinese representatives
to the Joint Commission.
Unlike the OES at the State Department, however, SSTC is a science agency; it
has a staff with strong career commitments to the Commission, and it has a special
budget for the conduct of international S&T relations, including those with the Unit-
ed States. In the early post-normalization period, access to the institutes of the CAS
and to universities under SEDC was also highly centralized through the specialized
foreign affairs offices of these two organizations, both of which had dedicated bud-
gets for international cooperation. As time passed, however, and as the relationship
became more complex and multifaceted, and as China itself became more decentral-
ized, the institutes of CAS and the universities acquired more autonomous discretion
in the nature of their international contacts. With the establishment of the National
Natural Science Foundation of China and the pluralization of funding sources for re-
search, this reformist decentralization now gives individual investigators the auton-
omy and access to resources to engage in a broad range of cooperative projects with
investigators abroad. Nevertheless, central oversight over these activities is still
maintained by the units noted above, with the result that China exhibits a clearer
sense of coherent policy purpose in its relations with the United States than the Unit-
ed States does in defining its stance toward China. At the implementation stage,
however, the differences may be less apparent; like the United States, China is a large
complex country which increasingly defies unified central governance, and inter-
agency coordination in China can be notoriously abysmal.
Trends during the 1980s
The euphoria surrounding China–U.S. reconciliation and normalization gave way
to serious strains in the relationship during the first two years of the Reagan Admin-
istration, with disagreement over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan being perhaps the main
cause.9 The S&T relationship could not prevent conflict over such an important po-
litical issue, but activities in the S&T relationship were continued during this diffi-
cult time. S&T relations did not play a major role in the resolution of the conflict
directly, but Chinese interest in gaining access to U.S. technology and to training op-
portunities—factors that helped define China’s stake in relations with the United
States in the late 1970s—were certainly on Chinese minds when China’s leaders
agreed to accept the terms of the Joint Communique on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
in August 1982.10 In addition, with the temporary resolution of this difficult matter,
mutual interests in the S&T relationship contributed to the revitalization of
U.S.–China relations in late 1982 and 1983.
After the settlement of the Taiwan dispute, relations between the countries be-
came more dynamic and exciting. New nongovernmental programs were initiated,
such as the American Physical Society’s effort (with cooperation from the New York
Academy of Sciences) to provide advanced laboratory training for promising Chi-
nese physicists whose educational careers had been disrupted by the Cultural Revo-
lution. The number of government-to-government S&T programs increased,
regulations for the export of advanced technologies to China were liberalized, U.S.
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investment in China increased, and, importantly, the number of Chinese students and
scholars coming to the United States (now, typically, for full graduate degree pro-
grams paid for by U.S. sources rather than the shorter one or two advanced training
visits paid for by China of the first few years after normalization) began to increase
rapidly.11 Yet, as Harry Harding has rightly observed of this period, the progress of
U.S.–China relations was increasingly hostage to the progress of Chinese domestic
reforms.12
This was true in a variety of areas. The renewed enthusiasm for China among U.S.
investors faced a Chinese investment climate that turned out to be filled with prob-
lems for the foreign business person. Liberalization of export controls affecting tech-
nology transfers faced a lack of transparency concerning the true end-users of
advanced dual-use know-how. Moreover, the growing awareness in the United States
of the importance of protecting intellectual property rights, had yet to become a se-
rious topic of discussion in China. With the Chinese academic and research environ-
ments still rather impoverished and poorly managed, their allure to Chinese students
studying abroad was limited, and the prospects of an increasingly serious brain drain
began to loom.13 Indeed, by 1986, China began accusing the U.S. government of en-
couraging one.14 Thus, in interesting ways, the positive orientations that both coun-
tries had for expanding and deepening S&T cooperation also engendered their own
irritants and problems.
It was also during this period that human rights issues began to assume a more
central place in the relationship, and this too was a function of the uneven pace of
change in China. By the mid-1980s, China had become a much freer place than it
had been just a few years before. But the liberalization that had made this freer at-
mosphere possible was not fully institutionalized, and explicit understandings of po-
litical rights were still a long way from being recognized. Discussions within the
intellectual community for a clearer sense of rights and greater liberalization began
during the 1980s.15 While these were not solely the stirrings of the scientific com-
munity, certain key scientists became active in dissent over the course of China’s re-
forms. Important debates began to unfold in key publications, such as Dialectics of
Nature, over the relationships between scientific and technological development and
democratization and political liberalism. For historian of science and translator of
Einstein, Xu Liangying, 
Science and democracy were mutually supportive: political democracy provided the
open social context required for science’s pursuit of the truth free from external pres-
sure or constraint, and science supplied society with the ideals of rational inquiry and
respect for the truth at all costs that made democracy feasible.16
Unofficial discussions of such topics became more widespread in China’s univer-
sities, and in late 1986 they led to student demonstrations at various locations around
China—demonstrations that were promptly suppressed. Among the scientists in-
volved, a key figure in these developments was astrophysicist, Fang Lizhi. Fang had
been the Vice President of the CAS’s University of Science and Technology at the
time of the December 1986 student demonstrations, in which he was implicated. He
was subsequently removed from that office and given a research position at the
Beijing Observatory, but he continued to be active in discussions within the academ-
ic community over the prospects for a new liberal order in a modernized China.
Fang’s importance as a human rights figure in the American consciousness increased
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in early 1989 when he was added to the list of invitees to a major reception given by
the United States on the occasion of President Bush’s visit to Beijing. The Chinese
government was extremely annoyed at this move and took steps to prevent Fang, his
wife, and Perry Link, the director of the CSCPRC office in Beijing, from attending.
Attention to Fang’s role as a symbol of the human rights struggle in China grew
within the U.S. technical community after he took refuge in the U.S. Embassy fol-
lowing the Tiananmen events.
TIANANMEN AND THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
While the period leading up to the tragic events of June 4, 1989 began to awaken
human rights concerns among Americans, it was the televised images of the repres-
sion of the Tiananmen demonstrations which seared Chinese human rights violations
into U.S. public consciousness. The result has been that human rights issues have
come to occupy a central and highly conflictual position in U.S.–China relations.
The U.S. government responded to the Beijing events with a variety of sanctions
which had the effect of temporarily suspending most S&T activities. The National
Science Foundation, for instance, discontinued staff travel to China, urged its grant-
ees to defer China travel, and reduced travel funds for visits to China.17 The National
Academy of Sciences also responded very quickly. On June 5, the following mes-
sage was sent by NAS President Frank Press to CAS president (and NAS foreign as-
sociate) Zhou Guangzhao: 
We are shocked and dismayed by the action of Chinese government troops against
peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere in Beijing, with such great
loss of life. While we earnestly hope to maintain our cooperation with your Academy
and other Chinese institutions, we must suspend all activities for the time being. We do
so in outrage and sadness.18
Similar messages were sent to the other Chinese agencies with which NAS and
CSCPRC had relations: the State Science and Technology Commission, the State
Education Commission, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the Chinese
Association of Science and Technology.19 In addition to the actions of the govern-
ment and NAS, a number of professional societies expressed dismay at the crack-
down and, with many universities, suspended programs and activities with Chinese
counterparts. Many U.S. researchers who had dealt with China before Tiananmen
felt revulsion at what had happened and, like much of the American public, found
their positive orientations towards China being replaced by negative ones. At the
same time, some scientists felt that a distinction should be made between relations
with the government and those with professional colleagues. Yang Chen-ning, for in-
stance, was quoted as supporting the Bush Administration suspension of high-level
contacts, but as favoring the maintenance of “scholarly exchanges … to keep traffic
and intercourse with China going as much as possible.”20
Many Chinese intellectuals who sympathized with the student demonstrations of
the spring of 1989, and were themselves shocked and saddened by the actions taken
by their government, welcomed the strong U.S. responses. However, many others
did not.21 In the weeks and months following June 4, many members of the Chinese
academic community feared harsh reprisals from the regime and the reinstatement
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of policies that would have led to greater relative isolation than they had become ac-
customed to during the 1980s. Although they might have lost most of their residual
sympathies for the Chinese government as a result of its actions at Tiananmen, they
both feared isolation and felt that in the interest of China’s development as a modern
open society, S&T relations had to be maintained. Although some of the Chinese or-
ganizations responded to the communications they had received from the NAS by re-
peating the harsh language adopted by the Communist regime about the need to put
down the “counter revolutionary uprising,” the CAS responded in a more concilia-
tory fashion, expressing the importance it attached to its relations with the NAS and
appreciation of the efforts made by both sides to build it over the course of some 20
years.
By the Fall of 1989, travel between the two countries by elite scientists was be-
ginning to resume, and with it came the recognition that the resumption of programs
of cooperation were both possible and desirable. Zhou Guangzhao visited the United
States in the Fall and indicated that the Chinese side wished to resume activities and
that conditions within the Academy had pretty much returned to normal.22 Report-
edly, Zhou was able to insulate CAS staff from much of the worst post-Tiananmen
political inquisition, something that leaders at the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences and at many universities, especially Peking University, were unable or unwill-
ing to do. More generally, although the regime’s reprisals against some institutions
and individuals were quite draconian, the worst fears of many intellectuals in the
summer of 1989 were not realized as a degree of “normalcy” was reinstituted and as
the regime sought to demonstrate that the basic course of its “open” policy was un-
changed.
The acceptance of these assurances by the United States was slower in coming,
and when it did, it came with qualifications. In August,1989, acting CSCPRC direc-
tor Robert Geyer went to China to assess the situation. Largely on the basis of his
report, which painted a mixed picture of the state of academic life in China at the
time, the CSCPRC resumed its program of sending graduate students to China for
research and advanced training. Since the NAS had not yet lifted its ban, this re-
sumption of activities was done in the names of the SSRC and ACLS. In April 1990,
the NAS dispatched Vice President James Ebert (accompanied by Geyer and Victor
Rabinowitz) to China to assess how scientists were coping in the post-Tiananmen en-
vironment. In June, 1990, the NAS Council approved a resolution which opened up
in a limited and qualified way the resumption of programs and visits in the sciences
on a case-by-case basis, which then led to the rescheduling of a joint symposium on
gene expression and gene regulation that had originally been set for May 1989.23
The U.S. governmental sanctions announced by President Bush in June 1989 in-
cluded the suspension of high-level contacts between officials from both countries,
a decision that was only gradually rescinded by the Clinton Administration. One
consequence of this was that normal meetings of the Joint S&T Commission were
not held and the umbrella agreement was allowed to lapse. But within a year of the
crackdown, cooperative activities under the bilateral agreements were resuming and
provided much needed government-government contacts.
The role of S&T relationships in the events leading up to and following the Ti-
ananmen tragedy is difficult to assess. Explicitly, they had very little to do directly
with the background of Tiananmen, and their role in the fallout after the events
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should not be overstated. But, as factors influencing the context of the events in Chi-
na, they become far more important. As part of the multifaceted opening of China’s
scholarly and cultural realms in the post-normalization period, S&T relations with
the United States helped create very different ways of looking at the world among
Chinese researchers, professors, students, and officials, and helped liberalize the in-
stitutions in which they worked. We will never be able to document the full nature of
this change, but it clearly manifested itself in the scholarly—and not so scholarly—
debates and discussions found in journals appealing to the intellectual community,
and in the meetings held in academic venues around China from the mid-1980s on.
It is curious that with the exception of a handful of U.S.–China specialists in the
social sciences and humanities, the full implications of these debates for human
rights in China were not widely apprehended before Tiananmen by a U.S. scientific
community which had been so active in supporting the causes of human rights in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Fang Lizhi came to be referred to as
China’s Sakharov, but in truth Fang was less known and recognized in the United
States. In many ways—most quite understandable in light of the history of U.S.–Chi-
na S&T relations and the different levels of development of S&T in the two coun-
tries—members of the U.S. scientific community were often quite ignorant of the
culturally conflicted political environment in which their Chinese counterparts
worked. When, in the aftermath of Tiananmen the United States, as represented by
the NAS action, responded as it did, it may not have been clear to many in the Chi-
nese technical community what purposes were being served.
The resumption of governmental and nongovernmental S&T contacts in the
post-Tiananmen period was clearly ahead of meaningful political “re-normalization”
and undoubtedly did serve the “glue” function noted at the outset. But these probably
have been of secondary importance to the rapid growth in commercial contacts be-
tween the two sides after the post-Tiananmen stabilizations of the Chinese economy
and the reaffirmation of the reform and open policies that followed Deng Xiaoping’s
famous 1992 trip to south China. This post-1992 era, indeed, has opened up new and
more commercial modalities for S&T ties, discussed further below, which can be
said to mark something of a new era in the S&T relationship.
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING DOMESTIC POLICIES
ON THE RELATIONSHIP
Since the launching of an expanded S&T relationship following normalization in
1978, the domestic science and technology policies of the two countries have under-
gone important changes. In the United States, these have been driven by a combina-
tion of factors including new ideological perspectives on S&T policy introduced
during the Reagan administration, heightened concerns over federal budget deficits
and a strong anti-tax mood within the electorate, the increasingly close relationship
seen by many decision makers among S&T policy, the health of the national S&T
enterprises, international commercial competitiveness, and the consequences of the
end of the cold war.
These changes, while certainly less dramatic than those experienced by China
(discussed below), have nevertheless been relevant to the S&T relationship with Chi-
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na. For instance, federal agencies have faced strong budget pressures for a number
of years. That China programs have generally survived in the face of these pressures
is a measure of the importance attached to U.S.–China ties. On the other hand, bud-
get cuts that lead to less support for graduate students could have implications for
the numbers of Chinese students coming to U.S. universities. There already is a de-
cline in these numbers, although no one is quite sure why. In addition, funding cuts
contributed to the demise of the CSCPRC, and have led to the reduction in the num-
bers of U.S. investigators going to China, especially in the social sciences and hu-
manities.24
In another area, the growing concern about competitiveness has focused attention
on the state of high-value-added, high-technology industry which, in turn, has made
the protection of intellectual property rights a very visible issue in the relationship.
Well before the high-profile conflict over the commercial pirating of CDs and soft-
ware, the United States began insisting on the inclusion of stronger intellectual prop-
erty rights protection in the intergovernmental S&T relationship. This issue has been
a significant irritant between the two sides, and had frustrated efforts to renew the
S&T umbrella agreement.25
Domestic S&T policy change since 1978 in China has, of course, been transfor-
mative. Starting early in the 1980s and continuing today, China’s S&T system has
been the object of a series of major reforms that have altered the funding of research,
the structure of research institutions, the distribution of research efforts, and the ori-
entation of R&D. Universities have seen their research roles dramatically increased,
a national science foundation has been established, old Soviet-inspired research or-
ganizations are being reconfigured as “key” or “open” laboratories or “engineering
research centers,” and research centers have been strongly encouraged to serve mar-
ket needs. In addition, leadership in research organizations and scientific institutions
is now based strongly on technical achievement criteria rather than political loyalty.
Many of the new leaders of China’s R&D organizations have had experience in the
United States. For instance, a number of the alumni from the American Physical So-
ciety program noted above have gone on to become institute directors or chairs of
the physics departments of key universities. U.S. education, including doctoral train-
ing, is much in evidence among those holding the rank of academician in the CAS.26
These domestic changes in China have had complex but generally positive impli-
cations for relations with the United States. First, it should be noted that the reforms
derive from China’s careful studying of the experiences of other countries. While not
the only model considered, the United States has certainly been an especially impor-
tant one, and the extensive governmental and nongovernmental programs between
the two countries have given the Chinese many insights into what works and what
does not in the U.S. system. Another important factor in the changes in China’s sys-
tem has been the activity of the World Bank. The first World Bank loan to China was
focused on upgrading the equipment and overall management of university labora-
tories. This first “university development loan” was followed by two others. In addi-
tion, the Bank has been supporting the upgrading of 133 “key laboratories” in
universities, the CAS, and government research institutes, and recently started sup-
porting the establishment of a number of engineering research centers. These World
Bank projects have helped foster the qualitative improvement of Chinese S&T. They
have also been occasions for additional contacts with U.S. institutions and U.S. prac-
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tices, through the procurement of U.S. equipment and contacts via the technical as-
sistance, advisory, and consulting provisions of the loan programs.
As with the United States, Chinese research organizations have also had to face
severe budget cuts, some of which were part of a reform strategy to make research
institutes more productive and economically relevant.27 As noted above, to the ex-
tent that these cuts led to the imposition of research fees which U.S. investigators
regarded as excessive, they were a negative influence on the relationship. Overall,
however, the cuts themselves do not seem to have had seriously deleterious effects
on the relationship with the United States, in part because of the more centralized
systems of supporting international scientific cooperation in China which can set
and maintain priorities.
The tilt towards commercial concerns found in both countries suggests new di-
rections in the S&T relationship. The strong concern for intellectual property rights
protection in the United States is beginning to find its echo in China as the quality
of Chinese science continues to improve and the market value of Chinese research
comes into sharper focus. There is a growing interest (sometimes resulting from the
market-access restrictions of Chinese trade and investment policies) among U.S.
companies in Chinese R&D as part of country-specific, regional, and global produc-
tion and marketing strategies.28 R&D and other technical services are being pro-
cured, and investments are being made by U.S. firms in research facilities in China.
Interest has also been shown in participating in some of China’s special national
R&D programs. This growing interest in Chinese S&T by U.S. companies poses new
challenges for Chinese policymakers who both want the U.S. commercial participa-
tion, but are concerned that too large a share of the benefits of Chinese brain power
may be captured by foreigners with such participation. These challenges are now be-
ing examined within China, and new policy directions can be expected. Chinese ef-
forts to limit foreign investment in research in China could become a new source of
conflict.
Overall, the changes within China as a result of its domestic S&T policies since
the late 1970s have led to a more capable S&T system and to the reduction in the gap
between relative capabilities of the systems of the two countries. This should make
the nature of S&T cooperation in the future more like that between equals. Whether
this will result in relations that are more integrative or conflictual remains to be seen.
LESSONS FROM THE RELATIONSHIP
What does the nearly two-decade Sino-U.S. experience teach us about the role of
scientific cooperation in the resolution of international conflicts? As the preceding
discussion illustrates, the extent, and the multifaceted nature of the relationship
makes the identification of lessons difficult. In an attempt to simplify a complex re-
ality, let us focus the discussion initially on three issues.
The Role of Governments
The establishment of the U.S.–China S&T relationship was part of major foreign
policy initiatives taken by both sides to enhance security and advance national inter-
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ests through the normalization of relations after 30 years of isolation and hostility.
The role of the governments in S&T cooperation was thus central from the start, and
it continues to be quite important for providing an overall framework for the rela-
tionship.
Yet, S&T cooperation between the two sides has also become so much more than
the government–government relationship that by the mid-1990s, the importance of
the latter is often obscured. In a sense, this is as the U.S. government had hoped in
1978–79, in its efforts to build a web of relations between the two countries. The de-
centralized and pluralistic nature of the relationship has had the effect of protecting
it from the more volatile swings in the political relations between the two countries.
At the same time, as illustrated by reactions to the Tiananmen events from within the
U.S. technical community, decentralized, pluralistic participation can mean that neg-
ative feelings towards the Chinese government and other Chinese institutions can en-
dure even as official relations at the intergovernmental level improve.
Motivations for Cooperative Activities
A number of motives for cooperation can be identified among the various parties
on the two sides apart from the original political motives, noted above. One of the
more interesting issues in considering the motivations for cooperation is the extent
to which motives on the two sides have or have not been symmetrical.
In China, at government and institutional levels, there has been a strong utilitarian
thrust to cooperation with the U.S.: a concern for strengthening the country through
gaining access to advanced technologies and the training of a new generation of stu-
dents. At the level of the individual, genuine commitments to cooperative advance-
ment of science and the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity undoubtedly came into
play. Yet, here too, utilitarian interests are in evidence, for example, in the form of
individual desires to leave China and find new opportunities abroad, gain access
though travel abroad to a variety of consumer goods not available in China, and to
enhance one’s career in China as a result of experience in the United States.
In the United States, utilitarian values have also been in evidence. The govern-
ment wanted to bind China closer to U.S. interests and create a more welcoming and
understanding atmosphere in China for U.S. values. It wished to learn more about
China’s S&T capabilities as these pertained to military and economic potential, and
it also was concerned about the possibilities for creating economic opportunities for
U.S. firms that S&T cooperation might facilitate. In addition, a number of govern-
ment agencies, such as the United States Geological Survey (USGS), National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Department of Agriculture
saw a natural convergence of scientific cooperation and the pursuit of their bureau-
cratic missions.
For non-government actors in the United States, both institutional and individual,
considerable excitement was felt over the prospect of bringing the Chinese technical
community into the fold of international science. The opportunities to train bright
young Chinese scientists not only helped replenish the ranks of graduate students in
U.S. universities, but also offered the possibilities of long-term collaborative rela-
tionships of value. As with Chinese counterparts, for some in the United States (es-
pecially for “China specialists” in the humanities and social sciences), collaborative
relations with China offered valuable new opportunities to enhance careers.
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With countries as large and diverse as China and the United States, and with the
numbers of researchers and research administrators from the two countries being as
large as they have been, it is difficult to fully account for all the motivations at work
in the relationship. Nevertheless, in light of these size and complexity problems, we
should also note the unexpected consequences that arose from the relationship, since
what various parties got out of participation was not always what was intended.
These unintended consequences, in turn, helped alter motives and expectations in a
reiterative process which has yet to run its course. China’s utilitarian expectations
have not been met in the ways anticipated, although many utilitarian gains have been
made. Building a cadre of technical personnel trained at the best U.S. universities to
work in China to further national wealth and power, for instance, has been frustrated
by the brain drain, but service to China is still being rendered in unanticipated ways
by those who have remained in the United States and who are successfully living
“the American dream.”29 Whereas U.S. investigators (and their funders) once as-
sumed that special allowances would have to be made for a lower level of develop-
ment of Chinese research in the crafting and defense of research proposals, this is
less the case today.
Implementation
I have noted above that in addition to asymmetrical motivations, there were also
asymmetries in the institutions which the two sides brought to the relationship. Nev-
ertheless, in the implementation of cooperative programs, these were not allowed to
derail the relationship.
In the government programs, in spite of frequent changes of personnel at the pol-
icy level in the United States with changes in administrations, many of the officials
in the technical agencies, like their Chinese counterparts, have been in place for a
number of years. These officials from the two countries have come to know each oth-
er over the years and together they represent a cadre of competent managers for the
conduct of the relationship. Since the implementation of the government-to-govern-
ment accords were allowed to devolve to the technical agencies after the original
high-level initiation of the program, implementation tended to be driven by pragmat-
ic agency concerns over program costs and benefits in relation to agency missions.
This approach either allowed complementarities in objectives to be found or led to
the merciful death of programs that lacked mutual benefit.
Outside of the governmental relationship, there seems to have been a fortuitous
combination of good will and self-interest on both sides to push various forms of co-
operation to higher levels. This may have been helped by the considerable dispari-
ties, especially in the early years, in the various endowments of the two sides. U.S.
institutions, with their wealth of human and material resources, could readily afford
the new relationship with China, and could look optimistically beyond short-term
implementation problems to a bright future of cooperation with Chinese individuals
and institutions which would be good for them, for the country, and for science.
Finally, an important part of the implementation story is, again, the role played
by Americans of Chinese descent, and by some of the senior Chinese scientists who
had been trained earlier in the United States. The role of third parties has been high-
lighted in some of the other cases considered in this volume. While not literally third
parties, it is clear that these two categories of scientists have played a role analogous
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to that played by third parties elsewhere in bridging political, cultural, and organiza-
tional gaps caused by lack of familiarity and distrust. As discussed further below,
these two groups of actors, and the roles they have played, have to be seen against a
longer historical background.
With asymmetries in motivations, in levels of scientific development and wealth,
and in the institutions both sides brought to the relationship, one might have predict-
ed that programs of S&T cooperation would not have done as well as they have. Per-
haps this puzzle points to one of the more important lessons of the case. Any attempt
to manage these asymmetries and disparities centrally would almost certainly have
slowed the progress of the relationship, if not led to its stagnation. The fact that by
both design and necessity, the program was allowed to become decentralized meant
that if it were to work, many players at the grass roots would have to find the justi-
fications for cooperation in the midst of all the disparities. Perhaps in keeping with
U.S. norms, and with the direction of Chinese reforms, we can speak of the S&T re-
lationship being appropriately “marketized” early on, thus allowing participants
with disparate “utility schedules” to find “positive-sum,” or win–win exchanges in
ways that a more centrally planned and directed strategy never could. Yet, for the
“market” to work, a framework of political understandings was necessary. In return,
the positive- sum outcomes reinforced the framework.
THE FUTURE AS GUIDE TO THE PAST?
It is likely that the role of science and technology relationships between the Unit-
ed States and China will increase in importance in the future. The “new triad” of is-
sues that structure much of post Cold War international relations—security, trade
and investment, environmental protection—increasingly are shaped by changes in
science and technology, and the importance of these issues is already evident in the
bilateral relationship we have been considering here. In principle, the complex web
of S&T ties between the two countries that have developed since 1979 should be a
useful resource in managing problems that will emerge in both bilateral and multi-
lateral contexts. Yet, as one reflects on the areas of conflict and cooperation in
U.S.–China relations since 1979, it is clear that mutual interests in S&T ties have
been both integrative forces in managing areas of conflict between the two sides and
sources of conflict as well. However, in and of themselves, S&T ties have been of
secondary importance to other interests structuring high politics, even when the is-
sues involved (e.g., export controls, proliferation) have substantial technical content.
How we see the future roles of the S&T relationship in U.S.–China relations over-
all is likely to be influenced by three factors. First, the strength of the convergence
and divergence of the national interests of the two sides must be considered. On a
range of issues, Chinese and U.S. interests diverge rather than converge. A common
interest in checking Soviet power provided the powerful incentive for the two coun-
tries to put aside years of animosity and to transcend the enormous differences that
divided the two societies. Grand visions of S&T cooperation flourished while the two
sides shared this common strategic concern. When perceptions of the Soviet threat
began to change, the two sides had more difficulty finding common interests; indeed,
this condition has marked the relationship since the early 1980s, and has allowed the
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many areas of difference and conflict—Taiwan, human rights, aspects of trade policy,
strategic exports—to define much of how the two sides interacted. Of interest and
importance, however, periods of higher conflict did not necessarily compromise co-
operation in S&T. The rapidly growing, stronger, and more capable China of today
is likely to be a competitor of the U.S. in an increasing range of areas, a fact that
could exacerbate the divergence of interests, but that would not necessarily do so.
A second factor has to do with the ways the effects of globalization are treated in
the two countries. In both China and the United States, the rise of the global econo-
my has profound effects on domestic society: some members of the two societies are
advantaged, some clearly disadvantaged, and many others are left with anxieties
over globalization’s uncertainties. Globalization for China has the effect of amplify-
ing the importance of the United States in ways that are detrimental to the relation-
ship. The military, economic, and cultural dimensions of U.S. power internationally
gives it a special, privileged role in influencing the rules under which globalization
occurs, and this makes China uneasy. As China becomes more fully integrated into
international society, the United States expects it to observe these rules, but China
balks at many of them since it had no voice in their making. Interestingly, globaliza-
tion conjoined with the image of a “rising China” amplifies the importance of China
for the United States because of the former’s great size, abundance of cheap labor,
and unique potential to challenge U.S. assumptions about how the world’s security
should be achieved, how the world’s economy should be run, how human rights
should be defined and protected, and how the world’s ecosystem should be sus-
tained. Again, there is considerable potential for conflict growing out of these cir-
cumstances.
Whether these potentially conflictual circumstances lead to higher levels of con-
flict between the two countries depends in part in how the disruptions from global-
ization are managed domestically and on the types of leaders who emerge to do the
managing. It has, unfortunately, become good politics in both countries to play on
the fears of globalization, which in China (because of amplification) means that it is
good politics to also be critical of the United States. Clearly, it has also become good
politics in the United States to conflate fears of globalization and criticism of China
as well.30
Science and technology have important roles in globalization, and in many ways,
those engaged in doing and managing science and technology are among the bene-
ficiaries of globalization. But these roles are often somewhat elusive and can be
masked by some of the more immediate social and economic effects of globalization
around which negative sentiments can be mobilized. Thus, science and technolo-
gy—and U.S. and Chinese scientists and engineers—can be made to serve the more
conflict-enhancing, rather than conflict-reducing aspects of globalization. A major
challenge of leadership in both countries is to clarify the roles of science and tech-
nology in globalization as the latter affects U.S.–China relations, and to then mobi-
lize the two technical communities to work on positive-sum solutions to the new
problems of globalization. The experiences of the past nearly two decades of S&T
programs is an important asset for these tasks, and we are beginning to see joint ef-
forts along these lines being launched, especially in areas such as environmental pro-
tection and understanding global change. More enlightened political leadership from
the two sides could move these new opportunities for S&T cooperation along at a
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pace that would be more appropriate to the nature of the challenges. At the Seventh
Meeting of the S&T Commission in October 1996, both sides indicated a willingness
to exercise such leadership, as a number of problems of global significance—from
the environment to the developmental directions of industrial technology—were tak-
en up.31 Similarly, the NAS and CAS recently reaffirmed their relationship by com-
mitting themselves to a program of cooperation built around the challenges of
sustainable development, energy policy, and the encouragement of collaboration
among young scientists from the two countries.32
Experience with arms-control discussions also indicates possible trends in the
role of Chinese and U.S. scientists in working on global issues. Since 1988, scien-
tists from China and the United States have been meeting annually to discuss such
issues as arms control in space, non-proliferation, and non-first use. These sessions
have been held under the auspices of the Scientists’ Group on Arms Control under
the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament and the Committee on
International Security and Arms Control of the NAS. The Natural Resources De-
fense Council, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Federation of American
Scientists have also engaged Chinese technical personnel in arms-control discus-
sions.33 Efforts have been made by U.S. national laboratories with weapons and se-
curity missions to initiate exchanges with Chinese counterpart institutions.
Moreover, a series of Chinese-hosted international meetings, in cooperation with the
International School of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (ISODARCO), in the
1990s have allowed technical personnel from the weapons communities in the two
countries to exchange views on a range of arms-control and security issues.
It is not clear that these increasing transnational activities of China’s still-young
arms-control community, with its growing role for technical personnel, have had a
major impact on Chinese security policy. It appears, however, that these contacts
have led to the injection of new ideas and options into Chinese security thinking,
have introduced China to the common discourse used in global arms-control discus-
sions, and constitute an important resource in the pursuit of arms-control objec-
tives.34
Third, the questions of diverging and converging interests, and of globalization,
are not unrelated to the broader question of what U.S.–China interactions in S&T im-
ply for China’s search for a modern political and cultural identity. When S&T rela-
tions are seen as important parts of a larger cultural encounter involving basic
civilizational values, they become far more important than a more narrow construc-
tion would imply.
In the nineteenth century, imperial China was faced with an expansionist and
technologically superior West. Growing European and American power in East Asia
threatened and impinged upon Chinese sovereignty. But, it also presented challenges
to Chinese cultural values and helped induce a crisis of culture that, more than 100
years later, has yet to run its course. Modern science and technology were important
parts of this cultural challenge; the Western strength that permitted the humiliation
of China was linked in Chinese eyes to Western technological superiority, which in
turn was linked to science. For nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Chinese
elites, the question became how to foster modern science and technology in China
without sacrificing the values of Confucian civilization and Chinese identity. For
some, a modernization of China would be possible if Western technical knowledge
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would serve as societal means to ends set according to the Chinese tradition. For oth-
ers, the latter was itself in need of overhaul if not abandonment in favor of a more
science-based civilization.
While the China of the 1980s and 1990s is a very different place from the China
of the 1880s and 1890s, some of the basic dilemmas of means and ends involved in
cultural interchange and borrowing remain. Post-Mao China has aggressively sought
to build its scientific and technological capabilities and has turned to the internation-
al community, especially the United States, for help in this task. At the same time, it
has introduced far-reaching economic and S&T reforms domestically. Inevitably,
the reforms have drawn inspiration from the broadened international contacts for
new organizational arrangements, policy ideas, and institutional models for a re-
formed S&T system. However, the use of these new forms without also adopting the
broader cultural and philosophical contexts in which they occur involves difficult
tasks of discrimination, selection, adaptation, and assimilation of the desirable and
efficacious elements from the undesirable. Inescapably, such change threatens offi-
cial ideology and established positions of power, and can be conflict-inducing. Three
examples will illustrate the dilemmas that inhere in such “slippery-slope” situations:
• China would like to have a powerful national system of innovation. From its
interactions with the United States and other OECD countries, it has come to
realize that to have one it needs effective protection of intellectual property
rights. But once one begins to recognize rights to intellectual property in the
interest of technological enhancement, can one then separate that type of right
from the right to property in general? And once economic rights are recog-
nized, can political rights be denied?
• The introduction of a national science foundation and the practices of peer
review have been effective reforms (again, inspired from interactions with the
United States and others) that have improved national research administration
in China. But the emphasis these entail for investigator-initiated research
implies a very different image of the technical intellectual in society than that
which prevailed during most of the history of the People’s Republic. Peer
review is a means for improving the evaluation and selection of proposals for
research, but peer review presumes the existence of an expert community with
a body of knowledge that is beyond the ken of the state. Can one have a vigor-
ous and effective peer review process without recognizing the limits of “offi-
cial knowledge” and by extension, the need for autonomy for expert
communities? But if autonomous group formation among scientists and engi-
neers is to be tolerated for the well-being of science, wouldn’t it also make
sense to grant greater autonomy to experts in industrial management, in labor,
in education, and in agriculture, all of whom know their trades better than
state officials and Party cadres? But if such autonomy is granted, don’t you
begin to have a more vibrant civil society which will challenge and contest the
Party/state’s claims to the monopolization of political power?
• China’s rapid economic growth has led to serious problems of environmental
pollution and to a worsening industrial and transportation safety record.
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China’s transformation to a market economy means that it needs new regula-
tory regimes—laws, administrative agencies, technical standards—for manag-
ing the environmental and safety problems engendered by the working of a
market economy. Again, foreign institutional models and “regulatory science”
have provided inspiration for the building of these new regimes. The S&T
relationship with the U.S.—which has in place protocols for cooperation with
such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Departments of Labor
and Health and Human Services—has been an important source of such inspi-
ration. Again, however, there are problems of separating the regulatory sci-
ence and the legal and organizational components of these foreign regulatory
systems as models for China. While technical standards, policy models, and
organizational arrangements can be emulated—and they have been—can their
effectiveness in China be realized without the attendant factors that contribute
to regulatory effectiveness in a country like the U.S.? These include, in partic-
ular, legislative oversight, an investigative free press, and generally accepted
principles of democratic accountability.
Science and technology relations with the United States can be narrowly con-
strued, but to understand how they might pertain to bilateral conflict and cooperation
between the two states in the future, it also makes sense to see them as part of a
broader pattern of interaction in which the cultural and institutional settings for mod-
ern science are also involved. From a U.S. perspective, it is encouraging and grati-
fying that China should be as interested as it has been in emulating this broader
S&T–related societal infrastructure. In principle, this should make future coopera-
tion on a range of projects and problems easier than in the past.
However, Chinese assimilation of this infrastructure will not always follow the
path and pace that the United States would expect, and this can cause conflict. From
a Chinese perspective, there is much to be learned from the United States about the
broader infrastructure for S&T and about the governance of a complex industrial so-
ciety. But the lessons are not all positive. There is much that doesn’t work in the U.S.
and much that would be inappropriate for China. That the Chinese side sometimes
seems to understand this better than the United States is also a source of conflict and
resentment, the United States often seeming to the Chinese as arrogant in its igno-
rance of its own failings. There are also, of course, ample reasons, stemming from
Chinese behavior, for the United States to perceive China as being arrogant in much
the same way. Thus, even as S&T, business, and cultural relations become more in-
timate between the two countries, Chinese concerns are still heightened about “cul-
tural imperialism,” “cultural invasion,” and “U.S. interference in China’s internal
affairs.”35 As China comes to share with many of its Asian neighbors a new sense of
pride in “Asian values,” a sense of satisfaction in Asian accomplishments in the late
twentieth century, and an anticipation of an Asian renaissance in the twenty-first
century, conflicts over civilizational values are likely to increase, especially if the
U.S. is careless in asserting the cultural power it could once use with confidence.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S.–China S&T relationship can be seen through various lenses and in dif-
ferent lights. Viewed strictly as a bilateral S&T relationship, it is the largest and most
ambitious such relationship that either country maintains. It has served many of the
scientific and political objectives that both countries had for it, including its being a
vehicle for overcoming many years of isolation and hostility. In this sense, it has
been a force for mitigating conflict. It has worked as well as it has because it has al-
lowed complementary interests to be found by a wide range of actors on the two
sides.
The government-to-government agreement and the many programs of activities
under it have provided an important framework for the overall relationship. By
stressing the principles of “mutuality of interest” and “benefiting side pays” (when
there is no clear mutuality of interest), the operation of the program may have missed
some opportunities, but it nevertheless tapped into the roots of real commitment to
cooperation which has weathered well the ups and downs of the political relation-
ship. But, of course, the government–government programs, while providing a
framework, do not exhaust the range of activities that make up the S&T relationship;
indeed, overall, it is a small part of the whole. The broader ties which wind through
the academic communities of the two countries, and increasingly into the industrial
sectors, further contribute to the relationship’s resilience.
As we have seen, however, the S&T relationship has not only been a positive
force for integration and conflict reduction, but has generated tension as well. At one
level, this has been the normal conflict one might expect in the implementation of
any cooperative endeavor between two very different societies. But the deeper and
more significant conflict is best understood when we realize that the S&T relation-
ship is more than what it appears to be when narrowly construed.
One does not do justice to the importance of the S&T relationship without recog-
nizing its symbolic value as a point of entry into a much more complicated cultural
encounter that is loaded with historical background and psychological and emotional
significance. It is in many ways an encounter that is unique to these two countries.
It cannot be understood apart from the U.S.–China relations of the past century, the
special roles that science and education have played in those relations, the large
numbers of Americans of Chinese descent in science and engineering who emerged
from those relations, and the large number of technical intellectuals in China whose
training in the United States was also a product of these relations. In addition, un-
derstanding the encounter also requires that we recall the special significance that
has been attached to science and technology by Chinese elites since the nineteenth
century as means to restore China’s greatness—militarily, economically, and cultur-
ally—and the fact that it has been nearly axiomatic among the Chinese that of the
countries of the West, it has been the United States, the “beautiful imperialist,” that
has been the embodiment of a science-based civilization and the font of technologi-
cal revolution.36 This kind of background means that more than instrumental consid-
erations are driving the cultural encounter, and that when disappointments occur,
they are seen as betrayals, and when conflicts arise, they are difficult to manage.
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U.S.–China S&T relations since 1979 have produced numerous new bridges be-
tween the two societies that did not exist at the time of the establishment of diplo-
matic relations. Yet, in odd but understandable ways, U.S.–China relations have
resisted “normalization” and have remained “fragile,” as Harry Harding has argued.
S&T ties, in their broader cultural manifestation, have certainly contributed to pro-
cesses of normalization, but they may be as much a force for fragility as for normal-
ization for the reasons noted above.
On the other hand, what has transpired in the name of U.S.–China S&T relations
since the end of the 1970s can also be viewed as the creation of significant assets for
further cooperation as the two countries begin to confront the problems of the twen-
ty-first century. China and the United States will be two of the world’s largest econ-
omies, two of the world’s largest international traders, two of the world’s largest
producers of greenhouse gases, two of the world’s nuclear powers, two of the world’s
major arms exporters, and they will be in possession of two of the world’s largest
pools of scientists and engineers. Science and technology will be increasingly im-
portant to both countries domestically and in their encounters with the problems of
international society. It follows that S&T will also be of increasing importance in the
bilateral relationship as well. Without unwarranted optimism, it is fair to assume that
S&T relations will become more of an integrative force in the future. If so, the ability
of S&T relations to play that role will be very much a result of the network of ties
and the many achievements that have come about from the encounter during last two
decades.
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